The path to the unitary state of Cameroon began in 1959 with a difference of views expressed between the Premier of Southern Cameroons and the Prime Minister of Cameroun at the UN. Addressing the General Assembly, Premier Foncha of Southern Cameroons stated that he preferred a federal system of government in the event of Reunification. Also speaking at the United Nations in February 1959, the Prime Minister of Cameroun, Ahmadou Ahidjo, stated that the people he led desired Reunification and that he had taken note of Foncha's statement. Nevertheless, the people of Cameroun did not wish to impose a unitary system (which he called integration) on their brothers under British administration by the sheer weight of numbers. However, if the Northern and Southern Cameroonians desired Reunification, the people of Cameroun were ready to discuss the method of achieving it with them on an equal footing.

The views of Augustin Ngom Jua, Foncha's deputy, were representative of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) as a whole. He considered that Southern Cameroons should first sever its links with Nigeria and become an independent state before opening negotiations for Reunification on a federal basis. Consequently, he was determined to make Integration and Secession the sole issues in the plebiscite. Thus, when Foncha was pressured at the UN in September 1959 to compromise his position by agreeing to substitute Reunification for Secession in the plebiscite, Jua and his closest collaborators seriously considered replacing Foncha as Leader of the KNDP. This was symptomatic of a more general unease. The UN's decision to exclude Secession from the plebiscite was, for the most part, badly received in Southern Cameroons where it flew in the face of popular expectations. The majority of petitioners condemned the restriction of the plebiscite propositions to Integration and Reunification and demanded a third option that would provide for a separate Southern Cameroons State, preferably with the Commonwealth membership. Some of them threatened to sabotage the plebiscite if Secession was not made part of it or if it was not cancelled in favour of a separate Southern Cameroons State. These protests, pleas and threats struck no responsive chord at the UN, and the clamour against the plebiscite options subsequently became more vocal and widespread.