If the old adage that two cocks cannot crow in the same compound is true, then one should not be surprised to come upon confrontations between the state and local chiefs over control of resources and people. The prefectorial order from Bui Division cited above succinctly depicts the nature of this confrontation. The main concern is to determine who has power over the village communities. From a position of strength, the state has sought to co-opt and marginalize the chiefs within its bureaucratic mish-mash as mere auxiliaries. The question is what can the chiefs do? Clearly, this is related to their prerogatives in the management of resources, and how they interact with those state officials that interpret and administer the land reforms. How they devise new strategies to cope with changes engendered by the implementation of the land law reforms should inform us on the transformations the institution may be undergoing, as the chiefs struggle for control over resources and people.

According to section 12 of Decree no. 76-166 of 27 April 1976 establishing the terms and conditions for the management of national lands, the traditional ruler and two of his notables are expected to sit on the Land Commission which is dominated by bureaucrats. Their inclusion on this commission was meant to ascertain the authenticity of customary claims prior to their being converted to statutory rights of ownership under the new law. That they were expected to perform rather marginal roles on the commission is quite obvious from the distribution of tasks. The Sub-Prefect is appointed as President, while the Chief of Service for Lands acts as the Secretary. Within the new framework, the Sub-Prefect perceives his role as that of a real chef des terres , a notion that was commonly used in former East Cameroon prior to the 1974 Ordinances. The real power of attribution lies with the chairman and his secretary, not with the chief and his two notables.

New strategies have been devised to gain some advantage from a potentially hopeless situation. The Fons require that the candidate applying for a land certificate or land grant should first come and pay traditional homage to the palace, failing which the Fon would boycott the session. Hence, the candidate is expected to present drinks and other gifts before the appointed day for land inspection. Evidence from the field suggests that the Fons generally accept a bottle of Scotch whisky and a '5.000 frs envelope'. Once this is accomplished, the Fon would then delegate two of his councillors to represent him during the land inspection.

Exacting such tribute from applicants is a strategy to maintain control over land allocation and also to replenish the coffers of the palace. Although the powers of the Fon and his two notables have been marginalized within the land commission, this ability to get applicants to pay homage to him in the palace is an effective strategy to maintain some political control.

This general state of affairs - of chiefs trying to maintain a firm grip on the land and its inhabitants - is particularly marked in those areas where cattle grazing is practised. Chiefs have always perceived cattle graziers as a source of revenue through their payment of tribute. Similarly, the colonial administration also viewed the arrival of Fulani graziers as a reliable source of income through the payment of Jangali taxes. The Fulani were subject to double taxation, in form of tribute to the Fon and in taxes to the State. This is ample testimony of a struggle for control.

In 1985, I witnessed the then Fon of Nso' installing a Fulani Chief in his palace , an event that had never happened before. The next day, the Fon was summoned to the Senior Divisional office to justify his action since the administration had already installed another Fulani chief for the collection of Jangali tax. The Fon explained that this novel event was intended to enlist a Fulani notable to his entourage of notables and was expected to give concrete form to the policy of national integration. Rumours had it that this was an attempt by the Fon to maintain his political control over Fulani graziers and extract a tribute from them. The Fon was sharply rebuked and instructed to stop meddling with the administration of the land. The attempt to install a Fulani chief represented a new strategy to maintain the Fon's powers over his wealthy Fulani clients. This brought further conflicts between the Fon and the Senior Divisional Officer.

This switch in Fulani loyalty from the chiefs to the Senior Divisional Officer is said to be one of the causes of mounting farmer-grazier tensions. The chiefs and their subjects have persistently accused the administration of colluding with the richer graziers in return for bribes in cattle from them. Not all chiefs, however, have taken the path of confrontation with government officers. Some chiefs have seized the opportunity offered by their membership on the Land commission to exact more tribute from their subjects. This is particularly the case in urban areas where chiefs enjoy much prestige from membership of a government appointed commission. Close association with state bureaucracies is significant to those chiefs with the status of vassal chiefdoms. The German colonial administration used chiefdoms, such as Bali Nyonga, to exact tribute from neighbouring chiefdoms. By the time the English took over the administration, the Germans had emancipated most vassal chiefdoms from that subservient status. They could then pay their taxes directly to the Germans (see Chilver 1967). For the vassal chieftaincies, this pattern of dealing directly with the state has been further enhanced by the decree that recognizes chiefs. These chiefs tend more readily to forge alliances with the state and its agents. Thus, serving on such commissions and boards is perceived as a sign of increasing social status. In such cases, there is an emerging class alliance between the state elite and the chiefs. These vassal chiefs look up to the state elite as their liberators. The mounting restiveness of these chiefdoms pursuant to the classification under the 1977 chieftaincy law is a case in point. Most of these small chiefs shower administrators with gifts in anticipation of an improved classification.

The relationship between chiefs and the state elite is complex and governed by the persistent quest to exert more influence in local matters. When the chiefs perceive that a net gain can be derived, they readily enter into an alliance with the state elite. This is particularly the case of small chiefdoms who now feel emancipated from the shadows of the more powerful chiefdoms. On the other hand, when they stand to lose, they not only adopt confrontational tactics, but also devise entirely new strategies (such as crowning a Fulani chief in the palace) to maintain political control. Control over land stands at the heart of these changing tactics. This already complex relationship has been further complicated by the current democratization process and the political polarization of the local population. The prime concern is to determine what paths the chiefs must chart in order to maintain control over both people and resources.